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Abstract
The theory of cut-free sequent proofs has been used to motivate and justify the design of a number of
logic programming languages. Two such languages, λProlog and its linear logic refinement, Lolli [12],
provide for various forms of abstraction (modules, abstract data types, higher-order programming) but
lack primitives for concurrency. The logic programming language, LO (Linear Objects) [2] provides for
concurrency but lacks abstraction mechanisms. In this paper we present Forum, a logic programming
presentation of all of linear logic that modularly extends the languages λProlog, Lolli, and LO. Forum,
therefore, allows specifications to incorporate both abstractions and concurrency. As a meta-language,
Forum greatly extends the expressiveness of these other logic programming languages. To illustrate its
expressive strength, we specify in Forum a sequent calculus proof system and the operational semantics
of a functional programming language that incorporates such nonfunctional features as counters and
references.
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Abstract

a sequent whose right-hand side is non-atomic is the
conclusion of a right-introduction rule. The bottomup search for uniform proofs is goal-directed to the
extent that if the goal has a logical connective as its
head, that occurrence of that connective must be introduced: the left-hand side of a sequent is only considered when the goal is atomic. A logic programming
language is then a logical system for which uniform
proofs are complete. The logics underlying Prolog
and Lolli 12] satisfy such a completeness result.
When extending this notion of goal-directed search
to multiple-conclusion sequents, the following problem
is encountered: if the right-hand side of a sequent contains two or more non-atomic formulas, how should
the logical connectives at the head of those formulas be introduced? There seems to be two choices.
One choice simply requires that one of the possible introductions be done 10]. This has the disadvantage
that there might be an interdependency between rightintroduction rules in that one may need to appear
lower in a proof than another, in which case, logical
connectives in the goal would not be reected directly
and simply into the structure of the proof. A second
choice requires that all right-hand rules should be introduced simultaneously. Although the sequent calculus cannot deal directly with simultaneous rule application, reference to permutabilities of inference rules
13] can indirectly address simultaneity. That is, we
can require that if two or more right-introduction rules
can be used to derive a given sequent, then all possible
orders of applying those right-introduction rules can,
in fact, be done and the resulting proofs are all equal
modulo permutations of right-introduction rules.
Using this second approach, we generalize the previous denition of uniform proof as follows: a cut-free
sequent proof  is uniform if for every subproof  of
 and for every non-atomic formula occurrence B in
the right-hand side of the end-sequent of  , there is
a proof  that is equal to  up to a permutation of
inference rules and is such that the last inference rule

The theory of cut-free sequent proofs has been used
to motivate and justify the design of a number of
logic programming languages. Two such languages,
Prolog and its linear logic renement, Lolli 12], provide for various forms of abstraction (modules, abstract data types, higher-order programming) but lack
primitives for concurrency. The logic programming
language, LO (Linear Objects) 2] provides for concurrency but lacks abstraction mechanisms. In this
paper we present Forum, a logic programming presentation of all of linear logic that modularly extends
the languages Prolog, Lolli, and LO. Forum, therefore, allows specications to incorporate both abstractions and concurrency. As a meta-language, Forum
greatly extends the expressiveness of these other logic
programming languages. To illustrate its expressive
strength, we specify in Forum a sequent calculus proof
system and the operational semantics of a functional
programming language that incorporates such nonfunctional features as counters and references.

1 Introduction
In 17] a proof theoretic foundation for logic programming was proposed in which logic programs are
collections of formulas used to specify the meaning
of non-logical constants and computation is identied
with goal-directed search for proofs. Using the sequent
calculus, this can be formalized by having the sequent
;! G denote the state of an idealized logic programming interpreter, where the current set of nonlogical constants (the signature) is , the current logic
program is the set of formulas , and the formula to
be established, called the query or goal, is G. All
the non-logical constants in G and the formulas in
are contained in . A goal-directed or uniform proof
is then a cut-free proof in which every occurrence of
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contain occurrences of &, >, , ?. Similar to the Horn
clause case, occurrences of ; and 8 are restricted so
that they do not occur to the left of an implication.
The reason that Lolli does not include LO is the
presence of and ? in the latter. This suggests the
following denition for Forum: it is the linear logic
theory of the formulas freely generated from >, &, ,
?, ;, ), and 8. It is this denition that we study in
the rest of this paper.
Since the logics underlying Prolog, Prolog, Lolli,
LO, and Forum dier in what logical connectives are
allowed at what polarity, richer languages modularly
contain weaker languages. This is a direct result of
the cut-elimination theorem for linear logic. Thus a
Forum program that does not happen to use ?, ,
and ; will, in fact, have the same uniform proofs
as are described for Prolog. Similarly, a program
containing just a few occurrences of these connectives
can be understood as a Prolog program that takes
a few exceptional steps, but otherwise behaves as a
Prolog program.
Forum is a presentation of all of linear logic since
it contains a complete set of connectives. The connectives missing from Forum are directly denable using
the following logical equivalences.

in  introduces the top-level logical connective of B.
It is shown in 16] that the -calculus 18] can be seen
as a particular logic program in this sense.
In this paper, we employ the logical connectives of
Girard 8] (typeset as in that paper) and the quantication and term structures of Church's Simple Theory
of Types 5]. A signature is a nite set of pairs, written c: , where c is a token and  is a simple type
(over some xed set of base types). A closed, simply
typed -term t is a -term if all the non-logical constants in t are declared types in . The base type
o is used to denote formulas, and the various logical
constants are given types over o. For example, the binary logical connectives have the type o ! o ! o and
the quantiers 8 have the type ( ! o) ! o. A term B of type o is also called a -formula. The inx
symbol ) denotes intuitionistic implication that is,
B ) C is equivalent to ! B ; C, and the inx symbol
; (which associates to the left) denotes the converse
of ;. The expression B  C abbreviates the formula
(B ; C) & (C ; B): if this formulas is provable in
linear logic, we say that B and C are logically equivalent.
All of linear logic can be seen as a logic programming language since there is a presentation of linear
logic for which uniform proofs are complete. To motivate the design of this presentation, which we call
Forum, we rst describe the four logic programming
languages that it extends. Horn clauses, the logical foundation of Prolog, are formulas of the form
8x(G ) A) where G may contain occurrences of &
and >. (We shall use x as a syntactic variable ranging
over a list of variables and A as a syntactic variables
ranging over atomic formulas.) In such clauses, occurrences of ) and 8 are restricted so that they do
not occur to the left of an implication. As a result of
this restriction, uniform proofs involving Horn clauses
do not contain right-introduction rules for ) and 8.
Hereditary Harrop formulas 17], the logical foundation of Prolog, result from removing the restriction
on ) and 8 in Horn clauses: that is, such formulas
can be built freely from >, &, ), and 8. The logic
at the foundation of Lolli is the result of adding ;
to the connectives present in hereditary Harrop formulas: that is, Lolli programs are freely built from >,
&, ;, ), and 8. (Some presentations of hereditary
Harrop formulas and Lolli allow certain occurrences of
disjunctions () and existential quantiers: since such
occurrences can be dened within the logic programming setting (as we shall see), they are not considered
directly here.) The formulas used in LO are of the
form 8x(G ; A1    An ) where n 1 and G may
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The other logic programming languages we have mentioned can, of course, capture the expressiveness of
full logic by introducing non-logical constants and programs to describe their meaning. Felty in 6] uses a
meta-logical presentation to specify full logic at the
object-level. Andreoli 1] provides a \compilationlike" translation of linear logic into LinLog (of which
LO is a subset). Forum has a more immediate relationship to all of linear logic since no non-logical symbols
need to be used to provide complete coverage of linear
logic.
As a presentation of linear logic, Forum may appear
rather strange since it uses neither the cut rule (uniform proofs are cut-free) nor the dualities that follow
from uses of negation (since negation is not a primitive). The execution of a Forum program (in the logic
programming sense of the search for a proof) makes
no use of cut or of the basic dualities. These aspects
of linear logic, however, are important in meta-level
arguments about specications written in Forum. For
example, a specication of a sequent calculus proof
system for intuitionistic logic can be transformed into
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shall use ` to denote provability in linear logic. In
particular, :  ` ; means that the sequent
: !  ;! ; has a proof (in linear logic) the notation :  ` ; means that the sequent : !  ;! ;
has a proof and the notation ` ; means that the
sequent :;! ; has a proof.

a natural deduction proof system by a use of linear
logic's negation (see Section 3). The choice of primitives for this presentation makes it easy to keep close
to the usual computational signicance of backchaining, and the presence of the two implications, ; and
), makes the specication of object-level inference
rules natural.

Theorem 1 Let be a signature and let G be a formula of linear logic all of whose logical connectives
are in the set f> & ?  ; ) 8g. Then ` G if
and only if the sequent : ;! G is provable in the

2 Proof Search

........
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proof system in Figure 1.

Inference rules in cut-free proofs over formulas containing only the logical constants >, &, , ?, ;, ),
and 8 have numerous opportunities to be permuted
over each other. In particular, any two occurrences
of right-rules permute over each other, any two occurrences of left-rules permute over each other, and
any left rule occurring immediately below a right-rule
can be permuted up. These observations about permutabilities can be integrated into a special proof
system, given in Figure 1. Here, two styles of sequents are considered. These sequents are written as
B ;, where is a
:  ;! ; and :  ;!
signature,  is a set of -formulas, is a multiset
of -formulas, ; is a list of -formulas, and B is a formula. The intended meanings of these two sequents
in linear logic are !  ;! ; and !  B ;! ;, respectively. (Here, !  denotes the multiset that results
from placing ! on each of the formulas in the set .)
In the proof system of Figure 1, the only right rules
are those for sequents of the form :  ;! ;.
In fact, the only formula in ; that can be introduced
is the left-most, non-atomic formula in ;. This style
of selection is specied by using the syntactic variable
A to denote a (possibly empty) list of atomic formulas. Thus, the right-hand side of a sequent matches
A B &C ; if it contains a formulas that is a top-level
& for which only atomic formulas occur to its left.
Both A and ; may be empty. Left rules are applied
only to the formula B that labels the sequent arrow
B A. The notation A + A matches a
in :  ;!
1
2
list A if A1 and A2 are lists that can be interleaved
to yield A: that is, the order of members in A1 and
A2 is as in A, and (ignoring the order of elements) A
denotes the multiset set union of the multisets represented by A1 and A2 .
Notice that all the right-rules treat the context ( ,
, ;, and A) as black boxes: they either discard the
context (>-R), copy it (&-R), or retain it (all other
right-rules).
The followingtheorem yields as an immediate corollary that Forum is a logic programming language. We

Proof Soundness follows quickly from the encoding
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described above of the two sequents used in Figure 1
into linear logic sequents. Completeness follows by
showing that any cut-free proof in linear logic over Forum's connectives can be transformed via permutation
of inference rules into a proof that corresponds directly
to proofs built using the rules in Figure 1. Similar style
completeness proofs can be found in 12, 15].
The completeness result could also be proved using a result of Andreoli about \focusing" proofs. Andreoli considered one-sided sequents and classied all
the logical connectives of linear logic as being either
asynchronous or synchronous. In our setting, an occurrence of a connective on the right of a sequent arrow is asynchronous and on the left is synchronous.
As is shown in 1], asynchronous connectives can be
introduced in any order without reference to context
and with no need to backtrack. Here, this corresponds to the fact that the right-hand side of a sequent can be decomposed until there are only atomic
formulas remaining on the right (we are, of course,
reading proof rules bottom-up). Also, since the order of decomposition is not important, formulas on
the right can proceed in a left-to-right fashion. Synchronous connectives can be introduced after all asynchronous connectives have been introduced, and synchronous subformulas of synchronous formulas can be
process immediately: that is, when processing a synchronous formula, we can \focus" the processing on
its immediate synchronous subformulas. Processing
of synchronous formulas can in general require backtracking. It has been known that backchaining is a
\focused" event (for example, Pfenning has described
backchaining as \immediate implication") Andreoli's
results nicely formalizes and generalizes this observation. (The proof system in Figure 1 was motivated in
large part by a proof system in 1].)
An analogy exists between the embedding of all of
linear logic into Forum and the embedding of classical
logic into intuitionistic logic via the double negation
3

:  ;! A B ; :  ;! A C ; & -R
;! A > ; >-R
:  ;! A B & C ;
:  ;! A ; ?-R
:  ;! A B C ; -R
:  ;! A ? ;
:  ;! A B C ;
:  B ;! A C ;
: B  ;! A C ;
:  ;! A B ; C ; ; -R
:  ;! A B ) C ; ) -R
B A
B A
:  ;!
: B  ;!
y:  :  ;! A By=x] ; 8-R
decide1
:  ;! A 8 x:B ;
:  B ;! A
: B  ;! A decide2
B A
C A
:  ;!
:  ;!
initial
?
-L
&
-L
& -L
A A
&C
&C
:  ;!
:  ;!
:  B;!
A
:  B;!
A
t=x]
B A
C A
:  1 ;!
:  2 ;!
t is a -term of type  :  B;!
A 8-L
1
2
-L
x:B
:  ;! A
:  1 2 B;!C A1 + A2
C A
C A
:  1 ;! B A1 :  2 ;!
:  ;! B :  ;!
2
;
-L
) -L
:  1 2 B;!C A1 + A2
:  B;!C A
:
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Figure 1: The rule 8-R has the proviso that y is not declared in the signature .
in Forum are logically equivalent to formulas of the
form C1 &    & Cn (n 0) where each Ci is of the
form
8y(G1 ,!    ,! Gm ,! (A1    Ap )) (m p 0):
Here, occurrences of ,! are either occurrences of ;
or ). An empty & is written as > and an empty
is written as ?. Formulas of this form will be called
clauses. Given that the formulas in the  portion of
the sequents in Figure 1 are implicitly !'ed and given
the linear logic equivalence !(A & B)  !A ! B, we
can further assume that all formulas in  are clauses.
Certain occurrences of logical connectives that are
not primitive to Forum can be removed from clauses
using the following linear logic equivalences.
(A B) ; C  A ; B ; C A ; B  A B
(A  B) ; C  (A ; C) & (B ; C)
(9x:A(x)) ; B  8x:(A(x) ; B)
! A ; B  A ) B 1 ; B  B
These equivalences can be used at times to avoid using the indirect equivalences mentioned earlier that
employ negation.
We shall not discuss here practical considerations
of how search for proofs using the inference rules in
Figure 1 can be done, except to note a problem in using clauses with an empty head (a head that is ?).
For example, consider attempting to prove a sequent
with right-hand side A and with the clause 8x(G; ?)

translation. In classical logic, contraction and weakening can be used on both the left and right of the
sequent arrow: in intuitionistic logic, they can only
be used on the left. The familiar double negation
translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic
makes it possible for the formula B on the right
to be moved to the left as B , where contractions
and weakening can be applied to it, and then moved
back to the right as B. In this way, classical reasoning
can be regained indirectly. Similarly, in linear logic
when there are, for example, non-permutable rightrules, one of the logical connectives involved can be
rewritten so that the non-permutability is transfer to
one between a left rule above a right rule (the only
kind of non-permutability in Forum proofs). For example, the bottom-up construction of a proof of the
b must rst introduce the
sequent ;! a b a
prior to the : the context splitting required by
must be delayed until after the is introduced. If
this sequent is translated into Forum we would have
the sequent ;! (a b ) ;? a b : In this case,
; and can be introduced in any order, giving rise
to the sequent a
b ;! a  b : Introducing the
now causes the context to be split, but this occurs
after the right-introduction of . Thus, the encoding
of some of the linear logic connectives into the set used
by Forum essentially amounts to moving any \oending" non-permutabilities to where they are allowed.
Using various linear logic equivalences, all formulas
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on the left-hand side. This clause can be used in a
backchaining step, regardless of A's structure, yielding the new right-hand side G A, for some substitution  over the variables x. Such a clause provides
no overt clues as to when it can be eectively used to
prove a given goal. See 15] for a discussion of a similar problem when negated clauses are allowed in logic
programming based on minimal or intuitionistic logic.
As we shall see below, the specication of the cut rule
for an object-level logic employs just such a clause: the
well known problems of searching for proofs involving
cut thus apply equally well to the search for uniform
proofs involving such clauses.

right (A  B) ; (?(left A) right B):
?(left (A  B)) ; right A ; ?(left B):
right (A ^ B) ; right A & right B:
?(left (A ^ B)) ; ?(left A):
?(left (A ^ B)) ; ?(left B):
right (B _ C) ; right B:
right (B _ C) ; right C:
?(left (B _ C)) right E ; (?(left B) right E)
; (?(left C) right E):
right B ?(left B):
? ; ?(left B) ; right B:
.....
...........
..
..
.....
.......
.......

.
...........
........
............
.
.....

.....
..........
.
............
...
.....

Figure 2: Specication of LJ: sequent calculus

3 Specifying object-level provability

the heads of clauses were dropped, it would be possible to prove meta-level goals that do not correspond
to any LJ sequent: such goals could contain left-atoms
that are not prexed with the ? modal. (Of course,
the actual Forum clauses result from replacing ? by its
denition: this example and some others suggest that
there are advantages to allowing ? as an additional
primitive.)
Notice that with the left-introduction of _, the formula on the right (here E) must be copied: since such
formulas are not under a ? modal, the inference rule
must explicitly copy the right-hand formula. This is
done by \synchronizing" (with a multiple-conclusion
clause) both the disjunction that is being introduced
and the right-hand formula, and then explicitly copying the right-hand formula within the rule (hence the
two copies of right E on the right-side of that clause).
The penultimate clause in Figure 2 species the initial sequent rule while the nal clause species the cut
rule. The well known problems of searching for proofs
containing cut rules are transferred to the meta-level
as problems of using a clause with ? for a head within
the search for cut-free proofs (see Section 2).
Let LJ be the set of clauses displayed in Figure 2
and let 1 be the set of constants of the object-logic
along with the two predicates left and right.

Given the proof-theoretic motivations of Forum and
its inclusion of quantication at higher-order types, it
is not surprising that it can be used to specify proof
systems for various object-level logics. Below we illustrate how a sequent calculus proof system can be
specied, and show how properties of linear logic can
be used to infer properties of the object-level proof
systems.
Provability in intuitionistic logic has well known
presentations using sequent calculus and natural deduction, both of which were given by Gentzen in 7]
as proof systems LJ and NJ, respectively. The LJ sequent B1  : : : Bn ;! B0 (n 0) can be represented
by the meta-level formula
? left B1    ? left Bn right B0 
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where left and right are two meta-level predicates. To
capture object-level contraction and weakening on the
left-hand side, we employ the ? modal. Since no structural rules are available on the right-hand side of LJ
sequents, no modal is used to encode that formula.
Figure 2 is a specication of Gentzen's LJ calculus.
(Expressions displayed as they are in Figure 2 are abbreviations for closed formulas: the intended formulas
are those that result by applying ! to their universal
closure.) The operational reading of these clauses is
quite natural. For example, the rst clause in Figure 2
encodes the right-introduction of : operationally an
occurrence of A  B on the right is removed and replaced with an occurrence of B on the right and a
(modalized) occurrence of A on the left (reading the
right-introduction rule for  from the bottom). Notice
that all occurrences of the left predicate in Figure 2
are in the scope of ?. If occurrences of such modals in

Proposition 2 (Correctness of LJ) The sequent
B1  : : : Bn ;! B0 (n 0) has an LJ proof if and
only if 1 : LJ ` ?left B1    ? left Bn right B0 .
Proof For the forward direction, an LJ proof can
.................
.....
........
.
......

.................
....
.
....
.
....
..
....

.................
....
.
....
.
....
..
....

be converted into a uniform proof of the corresponding meta-level formula by mapping the sequence of
inference rules in the LJ proof to the sequence of
clauses used in backchaining. Additionally, rightintroductions for and & and weakening, contrac..........
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.....

5

(n 0) if and only if

right (A  B) ; (right A ) right B):
right B ; right A ; right (A  B):
right (A ^ B) ; right A & right B:
right A ; right (A ^ B):
right B ; right (A ^ B):
right (B _ C) ; right B:
right (B _ C) ; right C:
right E ; right (B _ C)
; (right B ) right E)
; (right C ) right E):

1

: NJ right B1  : : : right Bn ` right B0 :

A proof of this Proposition can be done similar
to the proof of Proposition 2. The discussion of the
derivation of the natural deduction proof system from
the sequent calculus proof system provides a proof of
the following Proposition. For convenience, if ; is a
nite, non-empty set of formulas, let ; denote the
formula that is the tensor of all the formula in ; in
some xed but arbitrary order.

Figure 3: Specication of NJ: natural deduction

Proposition 4 Let Eq be the tensor of the last two
formulas in Figure 2. Then 1 ` ( LJ)  ( NJ)
Eq.

tion, and dereliction for ? will need to be inserted in a
straightforward fashion. The converse direction is as
simple: the sequence of backchaining steps determines
the application of inference rules in a corresponding LJ
proof. In the process of establishing this correspondence, it is important to observe how occurrences of
atoms with the predicate right appear within uniform
proofs: a simple induction on uniform proofs shows
that if a multiple-conclusion goal is provable from LJ,
that goal contains exactly one occurrence of right.
So far we have only discussed the operational interpretation of the specication in Figure 2. It is delightful, however, to note that this specication has
some meta-logical properties that go beyond its operational reading. In particular, the specications
for the initial and cut inference rules together are
logically equivalent to the proposition (right B) 
?(left B). This equivalence implies the equivalence
(right B)  !(right B). That is, we have the (not too
surprising) fact that left and right are essentially duals, and that this is guaranteed by reference only to
the specications for the initial and cut rules. If we
replace some occurrences of ?(left B) in Figure 2 with
right B and replace other occurrences with the equivalent !(right B), and rewrite the resulting clauses using
linear logic equivalences, we get the clauses in Figure 3. Since the results of rewriting the last two clauses
of in Figure 2 are linear tautologies, they are dropped.
Figure 3 contains a specication of Gentzen's natural
deduction system NJ. This specication is similar to
those given using intuitionistic meta-logics 6, 19] and
dependent typed calculi 11, 3]. Let NJ be the set of
clauses displayed in Figure 3.

The following theorem, rst proved by Gentzen in
7], is an almost immediate consequence of the preceding propositions.

Theorem 5 The sequent B1 : : : Bn ;! B0 has an

LJ proof if and only if B0 has an NJ proof from the
assumptions B1  : : : Bn (n 0).

Proof If B0 has an NJ proof from the assumptions
B1  : : : Bn, then by Proposition 3,
1

: NJ right B1  : : : right Bn ` right B0 :

Using Proposition 4 and cut, we have
1

?

: LJ right B1  : : : right Bn ` right B0 :

Since Eq follows from LJ and since Eq implies
the equivalences 8B:(right B)  ?(left B) and
8B:(right B)  !(right B), additional uses of cut at
the meta-level yield a proof of 1 : LJ ` ?left B1
: : : ? left Bn right B0 . Thus, by Proposition 2, it
follows that the sequent B1  : : : Bn ;! B0 has an LJ
proof.
For the converse assume that B1  : : : Bn ;! B0
has an LJ proof. Thus,
?
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and using cut and Proposition 4, we have
1

: NJ Eq ` ? left B1 : : : ? left Bn right B0
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and 1 : NJ Eq right B1  : : : right Bn ` right B0 .
The additional assumption of Eq stops us from using
Proposition 3 immediately. It is straightforward to
show, however, that any uniform proof that uses this
additional assumption can be converted to a uniform

Proposition 3 (Correctness of NJ) The formula
B0 has an NJ proof from the assumptions B1  : : : Bn
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proof that does not use that assumption. As as result,
we can conclude that
1

E1 = 9r(r 0)
! 8K V (eval read V K r V ; K r V ))
! 8K V (eval inc V K r V ; K r (V + 1))]
?
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.
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: NJ right B1  : : : right Bn ` right B0 
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E2 = 9r(r 0)
! 8K V (eval read (;V ) K r V ; K r V )
! 8K V (eval inc (;V ) K r V ; K r (V ; 1))]
E3 = 9r(r 0)
! 8K V (eval read V K ; r V (r V ; K))
! 8K V (eval inc V K ; r V (r (V + 1) ; K)]

and by Proposition 3, that B0 has an NJ proof from
the assumptions B1  : : : Bn .
Most logical or type-theoretic systems that have
been used for meta-level specications of proof systems have been based on intuitionistic principles (for
example, Prolog, Isabelle, LF). Although these systems have been successful at specifying numerous logical systems, they have important limitations. For example, while they can often provide elegant specications of natural deduction proof systems, specications of sequent calculus proofs are often unachievable
without the addition of various non-logical constants
for the sequent arrow and for forming lists of formulas
(see, for example, 6]). Furthermore, these systems often have problems capturing substructural logics, such
as linear logic, that do not contain the usual complement of structural rules. It should be clear from the
above example that Forum allows for both the natural
specication of sequent calculus and the possibility of
handling substructural object-logics.

?
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Figure 4: Three specications of a global counter.
the above clause. A familiar way to represent these
inference rules in meta-logic is to encode them as the
following two clauses using the predicate eval of type
tm ! tm ! o (see, for example, 9]).
eval (app M N) V ; eval M (abs R)
; eval N U ; eval (R U) V:
eval (abs R) (abs R):
In order to add side-eecting features, this specication must be made more explicit: in particular, the
exact order in which M, N, and (R U) are evaluated
must be specied. Using a \continuation-passing"
technique from logic programming 21], this ordering can be made more explicit using the following
two clauses, this time using the predicate eval at type
tm ! tm ! o ! o.
eval (app M N) V K ;
eval M (abs R) (eval N U (eval (R U) V K)):
eval (abs R) (abs R) K ; K:
From these clauses, the goal (eval M V >) is provable if and only if V is the call-by-value value of M.
It is this \single-threaded" specication of evaluation
that we shall modularly extend with a couple of nonfunctional features.
Consider adding to this specication a single global
counter that can be read and incremented. To specify
such a counter we add the integers to type tm, several simple functions over the integers, and the two
symbols read and inc of type tm. The intended meaning of these constants is that evaluating the rst returns the current value of the counter and evaluating
the second increments the counter's value and returns
the counter's old value. We also assume that integers are values: that is, for every integer i the clause
8k(eval i i k ; k) is part of the evaluator's specication.

4 Operational Semantics Examples
Evaluation of pure functional programs has been
successfully specied in intuitionistic meta-logics 9]
and type theories 4, 20] using structured operational
semantics and natural semantics. These specication
systems are less successful at providing natural specications of languages that incorporate references, control operators, and concurrency. We now consider how
evaluation incorporating references can be specied in
Forum.
Consider the presentation of call-by-value evaluation given by the following inference rules (in natural
semantics style).
M + (abs R) N + U (R U) + V
(app M N) + V
(abs R) + (abs R)
Here, we assume that there is a type tm representing
the domain of object-level, untyped -terms and that
app and abs denote application (at type tm ! tm !
tm) and abstraction (at type (tm ! tm) ! tm).
Object-level substitution is achieved at the meta-level
by -reduction of the meta-level application (R U) in
7

Figure 4 contains three specications, E1 , E2, and
E3, of such a counter: all three specications store the
counter's value in a atomic formula as the argument
of the predicate r. In these three specications, the
predicate r is existentially quantied over the specication in which it is used so that the atomic formula
that stores the counter's value is itself local to the
counter's specication (such existential quantication
of predicates is a familiar technique for implementing abstract data types in logic programming 14]).
The rst two specications store the counter's value
on the right of the sequent arrow, and reading and
incrementing a counter occur via a synchronization
between evaluation and the atom storing the counter.
In the third specication, the counter is stored as a
linear assumption on the left of the sequent arrow,
and synchronization is not used: instead, the linear
assumption is \destructively" read and then rewritten
in order to specify the read and inc functions (counters such as these are described in 12]). Finally, in
the rst and third specications, evaluating the inc
symbol causes 1 to be added to the counter's value.
In the second specication, evaluation the inc symbol
causes 1 to be subtracted from the counter's value: to
compensate for this unusual choice, reading a counter
in the second specication returns the minus of the
current counter's value.
The use of , !, 9, and negation in Figure 4, all of
which are not primitive connectives of Forum, is for
convenience in displaying these abstract data types.
The equivalence
9r(R1 ! R2 !R3) ; G  8r(R2 ) R3 ) G R1)
directly converts a use of such a specication into a
formula of Forum (given -conversion, we may assume
that r is not free in G).
Although these three specications of a global
counter are dierent, they should be equivalent in
the sense that evaluation cannot tell them apart. Although there are several ways that the equivalence of
such counters can be proved (for example, operational
equivalence), the specications of these counters are,
in fact, logically equivalent.

?

?

The proof of the third entailment requires no such
equations.
Clearly, logical equivalence is a strong equivalence:
it immediately implies that evaluation cannot tell the
dierence between any of these dierent specications of a counter. For example, assume 2 : E1 `
eval M V >. Then by cut and the above proposition,
we immediately have 2 : E2 ` eval M V >.
It is possible to specify a more general notion of references from which a counter such as that described
above can be built. Consider the specication in Figure 5. Here, the type loc is introduced to denote the location of references, and three constructors have been
added to the object-level -calculus to manipulate references: one for reading a reference (read), one for setting a reference (set), and one for introducing a new
reference within a particular lexical scope (new). For
example, let m and n be expressions of type tm that
do not contain free occurrences of r, and let F1 be the
expression

......
.........
..
.................
......

?

Proposition 6 Let

variable to instantiate the existential quantier on the
left-hand specication and then by instantiating the
right-hand existential quantier with some term involving that eigenvariable. Assume that in all three
cases, the eigenvariable selected is the predicate system s. The the rst entailment is proved by instantiating the right-hand existential with x:s (;x) the
second entailment is proved using the substitution
x:(s (;x)) and the third entailment is proved using the substitution x:(s x) . The proof of the rst
two entailments must also use the equations
f;0 = 0 ;(x + 1) = ;x ; 1 ;(x ; 1) = ;x + 1g:

2

(new ( r(set r (app m (read r)))) n):
This expression represents the program that rst evaluates n then allocates a new, scoped reference cell,
which is initialized with n's value then overwrites this
new reference cell with the result of applying m to the
value currently stored in that cell. Since m does not
contain a reference to r, it should be the case that
this expression has the same operational behavior as
the expression F2 dened as
(app (abs x(app m x)) n):

be the signature containing

eval, along with the constants of the object-level programming language, namely, app, abs, inc, read, the

integers, and the various integer operations. We then
have the following three entailments:
2 : E1 ` E2
2 : E2 ` E3  and
2 : E3 ` E1 :

Below we illustrate the use of meta-level properties of
linear logic to prove the fact that F1 and F2 have the
same operational behaviors.
Let Ev be the set of formulas from Figure 5 plus the
two formulas displayed above for the evaluation of app
and abs, and let 3 be the set of constants occurring in

Proof The proof of each of these entailments pro-

ceeds (in a bottom-up fashion) by choosing an eigen8

read : loc ! tm
set : loc ! tm ! tm
new : (loc ! tm) ! tm ! tm
assign : loc ! tm ! o ! o
ref : loc ! tm ! o
eval (set L N) V K ; eval N V (assign L V K):
eval (new R E) V K ;
eval E U (8h(ref h U eval (R h) V K)):
eval (read L) V K ref L V ; K ref L V:
assign L V K ref L U ; K ref L V:
....................
............
.....

..................
.............
......

................
...............
....

..................
.................
.....

that is, this expression can be evaluated in any store
without changing it. Because of their quantication,
garbaged stores are inexcessible: operationally (but
not logically) 8h(ref h 5) can be considered the same
as ? in a manner similar to the identication of (x)xy
with the null process in the -calculus 18].
We can now return to the problem of establishing
how the programs F1 and F2 are related. They both
contain the program phrases m and n, so we rst assume that if n is evaluated in store S0 it yields value
v and mutates the store into S1 , leaving the garbaged
store G1 . Similarly, assume that if m is evaluated in
store S1 it yields value (abs u) and mutates the store
into S2 with garbaged store G2 . That is, assume the
formulas
8kk S1 G1 ; eval n v k S0 ] and
8kk S2 G2 ; eval m (abs u) k S1 ]:

..................
..............
.....

Figure 5: Specication of references.
2 and in Ev. An object-level program may have both
a value and the side-eect of changing a store. Let S
be a syntactic variable for a store, that is, a formula
of the form ref h1 u1 : : : ref hn un (n 0),
where all the constants h1  : : : hn are distinct. Of
course, we can think of a store as a nite function that
maps locations to values stored in those locations. The
domain of a store is the set of locations it assigns: in
the above case, the domain of S is fh1  : : : hng. A
garbaged state is a formula of the form 8h :S, where
S is a state and 8h is the universal quantication of
all the variables in the domain of S. Consider, for
example, the program expression F3 given as
(new r(read r) 5):
This program has the value 5 and the side-eect of
leaving behind a garbaged store. More precisely, the
evaluation of a program M in a store S yields a value V
and new store S and garbaged store G if the formula
8kk S G ; eval M V k S]
is provable from the clauses in Ev and the signature 3 extended with the domain of S. An immediate consequence of this forumula is that the formula
eval M V > S is provable: that is, the value of M
is V if the store is initially S. The references specied here obey a block structured discipline: that is,
the domains of S and S are the same and any new
references that are created in the evaluation of M are
collected in the garbaged store G. For example, a consequence of the formulas in Ev is the formula
8kk 8h(ref h 5) ; eval F3 5 k]:
That is, evaluating expression F3 yields the value 5
and the garbaged store 8h(ref h 5). An immediate
consequence of this formula is the formula
8kk S 8h(ref h 5) ; eval F3 5 k S]
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From these formulas and those in Ev, we can infer that
8W 8keval (u v) W k S2 G1 G2 8h(ref h v)
; eval F1 W k S0 ] and
8W 8keval (u v) W k S2 G1 G2
; eval F2 W k S0 ]:
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That is, if the expression (u v) has value W in store S2
then both expressions F1 and F2 yield value W in store
S1 . Clearly resolution at the meta-level can be used to
compose the meaning of dierent program fragments
into the meaning of larger fragments. Hopefully, such
a compositional approach to program meaning can be
used to aid the analysis of programs using references.

0

..................
.........
....
.......

0

...................
................
.....

5 Conclusions

...................
...............
.....

We have given a presentation of linear logic whose
proof theory modularly extends the proof theory of
several known logic programming languages. The resulting specication language, named Forum, provides
the abstract syntax and higher-order judgments available in intuitionistic-based meta-logics as well as primitives for synchronization and communications. We
have specify directly various tasks in proof theory and
the operational semantics of programming languages.
Since the resulting specications are natural and simple, properties of the meta-logic can be meaningful
employed to provide interesting properties about the
specied object-languages.
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